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America's Stake in the Pacific

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26, it would have provided unambiguous proof that Japan was preparing to strike, as anticipated, in Malaya and the Philippines. But it does not explicitly outline the extent to which an attack on Pearl Harbor was the cornerstone of the Combined Fleet's battle plan. So far no original of this document in Japanese has been found among the records, nor any indication of the date on which this translated operational order (copy No. 145) reached American hands. While this in no way proves that it *was* in fact the War Warning received on November 26, its existence and the lack of any clear pictnre of the degree of the threat to Hawaii in it, fits the hypothesis that its contents could well have been the evidence of Japanese treachery that so shook the President that morning." (pp. 636-37).

This is great stuff for the publisher, of course, who can adorn the coverleaf with such goodies as "Due to the declassification of nearly 200,000 pages of vital documents . . . Costello has . . . cast new light on the causes of the war and the crucial decisions made by the Japanese and the Allies."

But in fact such language only obfuscates the true value of this work as an excellent synthesis of secondary literature published over the last 40 years, attested to by Costello's notes section. As such it begs attention from the officer and the academic alike.

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Seabury, Paul. *America's Stake in the Pacific*. Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1981, 82pp. $4

This short and gracefully written book argues convincingly that the Pacific is at least as important as Europe to the United States and continues in measured tones with an area-by-area Asian strategic status summary. It concludes with a list of principles to shape US Pacific doctrine. The message is that the Free World is still alive and fairly well in East Asia, especially if the United States adheres consistently to a comprehensive policy for the entire Pacific Basin and reestablishes its reputation as a predictably reliable ally.

Seabury regards the Sino-Soviet dispute as both a boon and a threat. The boon, a modest one, is 44 Soviet divisions tied down along the 7,000-mile frontier with China. The threat, greater than the boon, is that the conflict between the Communist giants tends to erupt outward as each attempts to gain flanking advantage by force in areas adjacent to each other. He cites Herman Kahn's interesting observation that this rift in the Communist world may parallel in some ways the Reformation that split Christianity. Violent discord may once again spur the evangelical zeal of the contesting halves of a shared faith and revive an increasingly moribund Communist ideology to the detriment of Asia and the rest of the world.

Seabury warns us to avoid using the "China crutch" as aid in maintaining a military balance with the Soviets who have always been an East Asian power but are now becoming a true Pacific power. Instead, he advocates a cautious policy of limited parallelism with Communist China in the relatively few areas where it serves our national interest. He fears that the Communist Chinese may be attempting to use the United States as the Soviets did in their temporary "opening to the west" in the 1920s when the Bolsheviks sought and got US capital to build tractor factories and steel mills and to electrify the country.

He characterizes the lesser Asian Communist nations, Vietnam and North

Korea, as armed camps. Amazingly, the number of people in the armed forces of the impoverished and supposedly drained Vietnam is two thirds of those of the large and wealthy United States.

The author's discussion of the vigorous economic power of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwau, and the United States' increased and changing role as a trading partner with them is illuminating. In 1979 the value of US trade within the Pacific exceeded that of trade with Western Europe for the first time. In a curious switch we have become the hewer of wood and drawer of water who supports the Japanese economic miracle. The United States now sells primary products—grain, soy beans, rice, and other raw materials to Japan and buys from that country automobiles, low-priced electronics and other products typical of the old-fashioned stereotype of the capitalist world exploiter. The frustrating problem of how to persuade Japan "to put its boots on again" and do more to protect Asian economic progress is discussed with fresh insight.

This concise book is recommended to naval officers for an evening of stimulating professional reading. It will invoke pride as well as increased understanding of the US Navy's continuing role in maintaining East Asia as a zone of relative peace.

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Swanson, Bruce. *Eighth Voyage of the Dragon: A History of China's Quest for Seapower*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982. 348pp. $26.95

There has long been need of a history of China and the sea, and we are indebted to Bruce Swanson and the Naval Institute Press for this fact-filled study. The intriguing title refers to the seven Chinese maritime expeditions of the first third of the fifteenth century. In one of the few official sponsorings of maritime activity in China's history, the Ming dynasty launched over two thousand vessels in sixteen years, and sent many of them (317 on the first expedition) to Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and East Africa. As many as 27,000 men were embarked on just one of these expeditions, and the technical capacities both of ships and navigation were far in advance of Western accomplishments of the time. A century later Pedro Cabral led the second Portuguese expedition to India in ten ships of under 300 tons and, possibly, 150 feet—the 62 "treasure ships" of the Ming fleets were around 180 feet and probably displaced about 700 tons. Mr. Swanson tells this story well; it is with the implications of his title and subtitle that some questions suggest themselves.

The author begins his book with a short analysis of the traditional Confucian continental civilization and the various philosophic, political, and cultural characteristics of the society that made it eschew seapower. Oddly, relatively little mention is made of the constantly dangerous pressure of the Central Asian nomad tribes on the imperial state (the Great Wall rates two fleeting mentions). Nor, is the autarkical nature of the Chinese economy highlighted, save to note quite correctly that it was directed toward a "self-sustaining market system." Curiously, Mahan's observation that "the necessity of a navy . . . springs . . . from the existence of a peaceful shipping . . . " seems to have been forgotten. In this section Swanson suggests (as he does several times in the book) that maritime power's role for a continental empire was always a difficult one and ". . . is a question which still has not been resolved." This does not sound like a man expecting an